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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents lessons learned from the Space Shuttle return to flight experience and the importance of 
these lessons learned in the development of new the NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Specifically, the paper 
discusses the relationship between process control and system risk, and the importance of process control in 
improving space vehicle flight safety. It uses the External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience 
and lessons learned from the redesign and process enhancement activities performed in preparation for Return to 
Flight after the Columbia accident. The paper also, discusses in some details, the Probabilistic engineering physics 
based risk assessment performed by the Shuttle program to evaluate the impact of TPS failure on system risk and the 




In the past, space vehicle designers focused more on performance and less on other system parameters. 
Reliability and safety was covered by designing for high safety factors. Safety factors are good if processes are in 
control and engineering analyses are bounding. However, past experience has shown that even for the best design, 
engineering analyses are not bounding in cases of excessive process variability and lack of process control. 
Designing and building a safe and reliable space vehicle involves good design and good manufacturing. In other 
words “design it right and build it right”. Quality control, and more specifically process control is the key for 
“building it right”. Additionally, process control is critical for performing adequate and bounding engineering 
analysis for design certification, and a key for a valid and bounding system risk assessment. Lack of process control 
could lead to reduced quality which leads to lower reliability and higher system risk. The Space Shuttle has 
experienced some of those cases, but has overcome these difficulties through extensive redesign efforts and process 
enhancements. The most recent example is the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
reliability issues that contributed to the Columbia accident. The TPS is a foam type material applied to ET to 
maintain cryogenic propellant quality, minimizes ice/frost formation, and protects the structure from ascent, plume, 
and re-entry heating. Figure 1 shows the main ET components that have TPS foam sprayed by automated or manual 
processes. Due to the Columbia accident, some TPS manually sprayed components were enhanced or redesigned to 
reduce defects. A type of defect of main concern, which was the focus of the return to flight (RTF) activities, was 
the presence of voids within the TPS foam. Figure 2 shows the enhancedredesigned manually applied ,TPS 
components. 
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Figure 2. EnhancedlRedesigned ET Parts 
ET RETURN TO FLIGHT LESSONS LEARNED 
The following sections discuss the lessons learned from ET Return to Flight (RTF) with regard to process 
control and its impact on TPS reliability and Space Shuttle risk. The next section addresses the relationship between 
process control, reliability, and system risk. The rest of the sections address specific experiences from ET RTF. 
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Relationship between Process Control, Reliability, and System Risk 
Quality engineering, and more specifically ET TPS process control is a critical factor in reducing the Space 
Shuttle system risk. Good process control for ET TPS translates to a lower number of defects and smaller defect 
sizes, which in turn, translates to a lower number of divots and smaller divot sizes released in flight that could hit the 
Orbiter and cause a Space Shuttle catastrophic failure. In other words, higher TPS material quality and capability 
means better TPS reliability and lower Shuttle risk. Figure 3 shows the relationship between process control, 
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Figure 3. Relationship between Process Control, Reliability, and System Risk 
We more often talk about process control in terms of statistical process control (SPC). The scope of process 
control is much broader than SPC. After the Columbia accident, an attempt was made by the ET project to 
formulate and implement an Integrated Process Control (IPC) plan for the ET TPS to ensure consistent processes 
were employed. As shown in Figure 4, the ET TPS IPC involved SPC, TPS application process control, 
manufacturing material control, contamination control, supplier process control, process change verification control, 
process monitoring, training and operator certification, and configuration management control. The focus of the ET 
project was on SPC, standardization of spray techniques, early detection of changes in materials, comprehensive 
technician, operator and Quality Control (QC) training, video review, process parameter data recording, and QC 
inspection. The ET TPS SPC activity involved identification of process factors that affect the product quality, 
determination of the relative magnitude of the factors and the factors’ numerical sensitivity, and monitoring of the 
process critical factors. 
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Figure 4. ET TPS Integrated Process Control 
The output of ET process control was the most critical input to the TPS reliability. As shown in Figure 5 ,  TPS 
reliability was defined in terms of TPS capability and system operating environment. The TPS capability was 
defined in terms of material properties, process uniformity, and process capability. Process uniformity and process 
capability were characteristic of process defect frequency and size, which were mainly driven by process control. In 
other words, ET TPS reliability was mainly driven by TPS process control. 
The output of TPS reliability was a set of probability distributions of TPS divot frequency and divot size, which 
were derived from the distributions of process defect frequency and defect size taking into consideration the effect 
of the flight operating environment. The TPS reliability output was a critical input to the simulation model that was 
used to evaluate the ET TPS failure impact on the Shuttle system risk. 
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Figure 5. TPS Reliability 
The following subsections address both the characterization and evaluation for redesignedenhanced and non 
redesigned (Use-As-Is) TPS respectively. The section entitled “Risk Assessment” describes the process that the 
Shuttle program and ET project used to assess the TPS reliability and system risk using the information and data 
characterization generated by the effort described in this section. 
Evaluation and Characterization of Redesigned ET TPS 
The following section discusses the approach used for improvements and evaluations related to manually 
applied TPS components. Manually applied ET TPS components were improved in two different aspects; a redesign 
of the TPS component, and an enhancement of the manual TPS application process specific to that component. ET 
TPS component redesign addressed the relationship between substrate geometry and defect formation. For example, 
the complexity of the underlying substrate was reduced, which corresponds to a reduction in the number and size of 
defects induced by complex substrates. Enhancement of the manual TPS application process included considerations 
for reduced operator to operator variability. For example, the sequence of operations were better organized and well 
defined with emphasis on operator training and certification specific to an ET TPS component. This allowed for a 
more consistent application process. 
Verification and validation testing of each TPS component redesign was performed, which provided sufficient 
data to evaluate and characterize the process variability and process capability. Process readiness was also evaluated 
using pre-control charts [4]. 
Statistical evaluation of the data showed that significant improvements were made in process uniformity and 
process capability for material properties for the enhancedredesigned ET TPS components. Significant reduction 
was detected in the coefficient of variation (COW of the process critical output parameters (e.g. density, plug pull, 
voids, etc.). Figure 6 shows an example of the Bipod Closeout redesign average density distribution. Furthermore, 
there was a significant reduction in the frequency and size of defects for the enhancedredesigned ET TPS 
components. However, void characterization was still difficult because of limitation of the data and lack of good 
definition of the right tail of the data distribution [ 5 ] .  
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Figure 6. Example: Bipod Final Closeout Average Density 
Evaluation and Characterlzatlon of Use-As-Is TPS 
Process variability for Use-As-Is foam was evaluated after the fact, without complete information about process 
variation and controls. In other words, the natural variation of the process was not well understood, and the 
relationship between process control variables and defects was not known. 
The dissection data collected after the Columbia accident showed excessive variability (COV is greater than 
100%) for process defect sizes and fiquency. Within tank defect variability was high, and tank to tank defect 
variability could not be fully characterized due to limited data. Defecdvoid characterization was difficult and 
statistics derived had a high level of uncertainty. There was also a lack of random samples of sufficient size to 
empirically select a distribution for characterization. Furthermore, there was no engineering rationale to pick a 
specific distribution and the data were very limited to characterize the right tail of the distribution [6] .  
As a result of the above process control unknowns and data limitations, statistics was used only as supporting 
data for engineering evaluation and analysis. Additionally, engineering factors were used in the derivation of 
certification limits as a penalty to compensate for the lack of complete understanding of process controls and the 
statistical limitations of the data. 
Risk Assessment 
The TPS failure impact on Shuttle risk was evaluated using a probabilistic physics based engineering approach 
[l] [2]. While traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) involves all the scenarios that impact the system risk 
[3], the TPS probabilistic physics based engineering risk assessment simulation model focused on the impact of a 
failure mode on the system risk. It is important to note that in a traditional PRA, judgment and error factors (the 
ratio of the 95th percentile to the 50th percentile) are extensively used in determining the uncertainty in the risk 
numbers, while in an engineering physics based risk assessment, the uncertainty evaluation is mainly driven by 
engineering data and engineering assumptions. 
The authors of this paper do not mean to indicate that traditional PRA can not be done using physics based 
approach. However, economically and practically speaking, only selected failure modes in a system PRA can be 
done using physics based approach. This is because physics based probabilistic risk assessments require extensive 
engineering information and extensive engineering models that are costly in nature, and as a result, their use should 
be limited to those complex and high risk failure modes. 
The section entitled “Traditional PRA” briefly discusses the general PRA approach, while the section entitled 
“ET TPS Physics Based Risk Assessment” discusses in the ET TPS physics based approach. 
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Traditional PRA 
PRA is a rigorous method to model what can go wrong with a system, predict how often it might go wrong (the 
probability that specific undesired events will occur), identify the consequences if something does go wrong, and, 
engage the design and development community to the fullest extent. PRA provides information on the uncertainty of 
the predictions and identifies which failures and, therefore, which systems, subsystems, and components, pose the 
most significant risk to the system. 
Figure 7 shows a generic PRA process. The master logic diagram (MLD) is a hierarchical, top-down display of 
initiating events (IE), showing general types of undesired events at the top, proceeding to increasingly detailed event 
descriptions at lower tiers, and displaying initiating events at the bottom. The modeling of each accident scenario 
proceeds with inductive logic tools called event sequence diagrams (ESDs). An ESD starts with the initiating event 
and progresses through the scenario, a series of successes or failures of intermediate events called pivotal events, 
until an end state is reached. ESDs are mapped into event trees (ETs), which relate more directly to practical 
quantification of accident scenarios, but the ESD representation has the significant advantage over the ETs of 
enhancing communication between risk engineers, designers, and crews. Upon completion of the event trees, Fault 
Trees (FTs) are created to model how failures and other events combine to cause failures of pivotal events 
(intermediate events) in the accident scenario. The pivotal events are placed at the tops of the FTs and deductive 
logic is used to identify the combination of events that may result in the top event-i.e., to develop the branches of 
the fault trees. The fault trees may consist of: the top event (pivotal event), intermediate events or logic gates, and 
the basic events. The basic events are linked to the top event through the intermediate logic gates. The fault trees are 
simplified through Boolean reduction to quantify each pivotal event in the scenario. The accident sequences (event 
sequences) and FTs are logically linked and quantified, usually using an integrated PRA computer program. The 
frequency of occurrence of each end state in the ET is calculated as the product of the IE frequency and the 
(conditional) probabilities of the pivotal events along the scenario path linking the IE to the end state. Scenarios are 
grouped according to the end state of the scenario defining the consequence. All end states are then grouped, Le., 
their frequencies are summed up into the frequency of a representative end state. As part of the quantification, 
uncertainty analyses are performed to evaluate the degree of knowledge or confidence in the calculated numerical 
risk results. [7] 
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Figure 7. PRA Process 
ET TPS Physics Based Risk Assessment 
The Shuttle Program identified and categorized all potential ET TPS debris sources in order to assess the risk to 
the Shuttle Orbiter. As mentioned earlier, the impact of an ET TPS failure on Shuttle risk was evaluated using a 
physics based probabilistic engineering simulation approach. The risk assessment model, although limited in scope, 
was very critical in understanding and communicating the risk derived from the loss of ET TPS in flight. Estimates 
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of the risk numbers and the level of confidence are heavily dependent on the level of conservatism of the 
engineering data and engineering assumptions. To date these conservatisms have not been driven out of the 
simulation due to modeling limitations, limited test data and a lack of time. 
The Space Shuttle ET TPS risk assessment approach as shown in Figure 8, consists of a five part probabilistic 
Monte Carlo physics-based simulation model. The first part of the simulation model is used to characterize ET TPS 
internal voids using the ET TPS void distributions. The main input to the simulation model was the ET TPS void 
distributions derived from the dissection data of the ET components under consideration. The second part of the 
simulation model is TPS debris generation and release. The TPS void distributions were input into a fracture 
mechanics model based on the physics of TPS. Divot size, shape, time of release, and pop-off velocity is generated. 
The divots generated in the physics based fracture mechanics model are then transported from the ET toward the 
Orbiter in the third part of the assessment. Whether a specific piece of liberated ET TPS hits the Orbiter is 
determined in the fourth segment of the simulation. If the liberated ET TPS is deemed to strike the Orbiter, an 
impact location, time, mass, velocity, and angle of impact is then generated. The final segment of the simulation is 
the Orbiter damage assessment. The final output of the simulation model is the probability of Orbiter damage 
exceeding a specified tolerance limit set for the Orbiter reentry survivability. 
As described above the simulation model is used to predict expected ET TPS liberation events, transport and 
impact damage. The results of the simulations are used to develop flight rational and to support near-real time 
analysis of witnessed damage during future Shuttle missions. Each piece of the simulation model offers unique 
strengths and provides significant improvement above the pre-Columbia capabilities. It is important to note that the 
void distributions represent the output of the ET TPS manual application process, which was basically driven by 
process control. 
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Figure 8. Shuttle ET TPS Risk Assessment Approach 
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IMPORTANCE OF SHUTTLE LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE NASA CREW LAUNCH VEHICLE (CLV) 
PROGRAM 
NASA is in the process of developing a new launch vehicle to replace the Space Shuttle. The new launch 
vehicle, called the CLV, is targeting an ambitious safety goal of an order of magnitude better than the existing 
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Shuttle. Using the lessons learned from ET RTF, the CLV program needs to emphasize two major areas addressed in 
this paper. The first area is process control, and the second area is PRA. With regard to process control, the CLV 
program should consider manufacturing and quality control upfront in the design process. Specifically, an integrated 
process control plan similar to one discussed earlier, should be put in place upfront and implemented though out the 
various phases of the CLV program. With regard to PRA, the CLV program should implement a structured PRA 
process supported with an engineering physics based analysis approach to assess system risk, and at the same time 
optimize the system reliability and system safety. In other word, the CLV program should use the traditional PRA 
system approach as a frame of work to identify the system failure scenarios and emphasize those areas where physic 
based in depth engineering modeling is required to help designers to minimize the risk of the failure modes that are 
complex in nature and have a major impact on the overall system risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Lessons learned from ET RTF experience demonstrated that a minor problem in process control could lead to a 
major problem at the system level which could significantly impact system risk. Consequently, good process control 
is essential in achieving high component reliability and low system risk. Manufacturing and process control should 
be considered up front in designing future space launch vehicles. Component designers should consider 
manufacturability as well as the feasibility of good process control in their design selection process. Finally, to 
ensure consideration of process control early on, an integrated process control plan should be developed upfront, and 
implemented throughout the different phases of future programs. 
Additionally, Shuttle lessons learned showed the need for component designer to perform a probabilistic 
physics based engineering analysis for those complex failure modes that might have a major impact on the overall 
system risk. This type of analysis need to be identified, planned, integrated in the program schedule, and performed 
upfront in the design phase and throughout the other phases of the program as necessary. 
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